Traditionally, the computation of similarity has been treated as a process acting over parts of static representations (e.g., Tversky's contrast model). In this paper, we argue for a more processing-oriented perspective, which maintains that "the whole processing context --past, present, and maybe even prospective --can contribute to the perceived similarity of things". This perspective leads one to a variety of hypotheses, which are not normally considered, from a static perspective. Three instances of this sort of hypothesis are outlined. First, in the area of people's judgements of the similarity of event descriptions. Second, in the judgement of the similarity of perceptual patterns that have previously been manipulated in a swapping task.
INTRODUCTION
Our goal in this chapter is to illustrate by example a perspective on similarity that has not received sufficient attention in the literature. For want of a better name, and one certainly exists somewhere, we call this the Dynamic Similarity perspective. Traditionally, the computation of similarity has been treated as a process acting over parts of static representations; this view is as fundamental to traditional models (cf. Tversky, 1977) as it is to more recent alignment models of similarity (e.g., Gentner & Markman, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1993a , 1993b Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993) . In contrast, the dynamic similarity view proposes that the whole processing context --whether that context is a past, present or prospective one --can contribute to the conceived similarity of things.
To put it another way, it stresses a class of "processing-oriented" respects for similarity (Medin, et al., 1993 ) that have not been given due recognition in the literature.
This perspective leads one to a variety of hypotheses, which are not normally considered, from the static perspective. Three instances of these hypotheses are outlined here, drawing on our work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. The first instance deals with how people's judgement of the similarity of event descriptions is influenced by the present processing context in which they appear. The second considers similarity judgements of perceptual patterns that are influenced by the past history of processes associated with them.
The third shows how, in artificial intelligence work, the prospective processing of a problem can be used in the similarity assessment of a case during case-based reasoning. The spirit of this chapter is a look-where-I-am-pointing one; our aim is to suggest a direction of investigation rather than to provide conclusive knockdown evidence. Before considering these areas of research it is perhaps best to first outline the static position as it stands.
STATIC SIMILARITY THEORIES
While there are many variants on the static similarity theme the two main representative approaches are Tversky's (1977) contrast model and the more recent alignment model (Goldstone, 1994; Dynamic Similarity The Static Nature of the Contrast Model Here A and i B represent the set of attributes that make up the entities a and b, respectively. So, (A ↔ B) represents the set of attributes that are common to A and B, (A -B) represents the distinctive features in A and (B -A) the distinctive features in B. θ, α, and β are parameters that reflect the importance of the common and distinctive attribute sets and tend to be used to predict the effects of a variety of task instructions on similarity judgements. Indeed, these parameters give rise to a family of models that characterize similarity judgements under varying conditions.
The function ƒ is a measure of the salience of the features or sets of features of both entities. It is often assumed that the salience of a set of attributes is
given by the sum of the salience of the members of the set (see Tversky, 1977, p.322 ). Tversky recognized that a variety of contextual factors could have an important influence on the salience of attributes. The two main factors he identified were "intensity" and "diagnosticity". Intensity refers to the "factors that increase intensity or signal-to-noise ratio, such as the brightness of a light, the loudness of a tone, the saturation of a colour, the frequency of an item, the clarity of a picture or the vividness of an image" (Tversky, p. 321, 1977) .
Diagnosticity refers to the degree to which an attribute serves to distinguish an object from a contrast set of objects presented with it.
The emphasis in Tversky's theory is very much on what could be called static similarity; it computes the similarity of two mental representations to one another after they have been constructed. Indeed, Tversky states this explicitly when he says that the feature-lists used to compute similarity are the products of "an extraction and compilation process that works over a wider set of knowledge" (p. 320). In contrast, we would like to argue that similarity is more dynamic, that any cognitive process associated with a representation also needs to be considered in any complete account of similarity. Keane et. al. 4 Dynamic Similarity In general, the dynamic account might lead you to expect two things. First, that such cognitive processes may add new elements to the mental representation of a stimulus that were not explicit in the original stimuli. This is especially true in the comprehension of complex sentence stimuli; for instance, people make bridging inferences and elaborate the state of affairs described in the sentence. For example, if one is told that B is on the right A and C is on the right of B, one may infer the implicit relation that C is on the right of A (see e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983) . Secondly, and less obviously, cognitive processes may contribute directly to the perceived similarity of two entities. That is, similarity judgements may be based on the similarity of mental representations and on the similarity of the cognitive processes associated with these representations.
The Static Nature of the Alignment Model
Many of the criticisms made of the static nature of the contrast model also hold for alignment models of similarity. Alignment models use a comparison-and-alignment process that has much in common with analogical structure-mapping (see e.g., Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Keane, 1985 Keane, , 1988 Keane, , 1997 Keane, Ledgeway & Duff, 1994 ; for reviews see Keane, 1993) . Alignment models characterize similarity as the matching of the common relational structure between two complex, conceptual representations. For example, if one were asked to assess the similarity of elephant and fish then the alignment model proposes that the slot-value structures of the two concepts be aligned to determine their similarity. Three classes of relationships are possible when two concept representations are compared in this way (see Markman & Gentner, 1993a , 1993b ; commonalities in which slot-value pairs in both concepts match, nonalignable differences when one concept has a slot-value pair that is absent in the other, and alignable differences in which the two slots match but their values differ (see Figure 1 ). This model adds relational structure to the characterization of similarity and has a much more constructive feel to it; that is, depending on how it is implemented computationally this model can have coherent feature and role matches gradually emerge from the comparison process (see e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989; Veale & Keane, 1994 , 1997 .
However, even though this model does a much better job of how aspects of a representation come to be selected during the comparison process, it would still not lead you to the hypotheses and predictions that emerge from the dynamic similarity view. It is to these expectations that we now turn.
MANIFESTATIONS OF DYNAMIC SIMILARITY
To summarize, the dynamic similarity view we are promoting asserts that process-oriented aspects of similarity are not well captured by current models.
As we said earlier, this view proposes that the whole processing context --whether that context be a past, present or prospective one --can contribute to the conceived similarity of things. The only research we have seen in the current literature that shares the spirit of these proposals is that on artificial grammar learning (Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990 ). This research also stresses how the processing context rather than the specific contents being processed can effect learning outcomes. Once this process-oriented view is adopted, the next question is "What processes might impact similarity ?"
Our immediate answer would be almost any process that you care to imagine as being involved in the processing of an item; for example, the comprehension processes in interpreting an item, the learning processes involved in storing an item, the retrieval processes involved in remembering an item, any processes involved with the use of an item in the past, and so on.
In the remainder of this chapter, we explore three samples of how we have applied the dynamic similarity view in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. In the first case, we look at how dynamic similarity involving present processes affects similarity judgements; based on the comprehension processes involved in understanding a sentence describing a complex event.
In the second case, we show how processes associated with the manipulation of an item in the past can affect similarity judgements. Finally, we look at how prospective processes might affect similarity in an AI system that determines similarity based on "what processes might have to be carried out" on the item. Keane et. al. 6 Dynamic Similarity
DYNAMIC SIMILARITY I: COMPARING EVENT DESCRIPTIONS
Tversky's theory has been largely tested on similarity judgements of object concepts (e.g., countries, faces, vehicles) rather than on more complex entities like events, sequences of events or sentences describing such things (see Eysenck & Keane, 1995) . In this study, we looked at judgements of the similarity of physical events described in sentences. In particular, we examined similarity judgements of event descriptions:
(1) The football bounced across the street and hit the wall.
( 2) The golfball bounced across the green and hit the flag-pole.
We know that a whole host of cognitive processes are brought to bear when people comprehend these sentences; for example, they will have accessed their mental lexicon for definitions of the words mentioned in the sentence, they may have accessed their long-term memory to find background knowledge relevant to understanding the sentence, they have constructed an elaborated representation of the sentence that may involve various bridging inferences. The product of these processes is some mental representation of the state of affairs described in the sentence.
From the static similarity perspective, people's judgements of the similarity of sentences (1) and (2) should be based on the respective mental representations of both sentences. So, to be concrete, a plausible extension of Tversky's model to judgements of sentence similarity could assume that the similarity of the events is based on the sum of the similarity scores of the matching entities in both sentence representations (i.e., the objects and actions) less a salience measure of the non-matching concepts in both sentences; that is,
where S a and S b are the two sentence representations, and M A is any element of S a that matches M b , an element of S b ; E a is any element in S a that is not in S b and E b is any element in S b that are not in S a . This "contrast model for events" is very much within the static tradition. Clearly, one could have an alternative static account based on the alignment model, but this model serves to illustrate our point and the criticisms we make of this model also hold for any alignment model. Keane et. al. 7 Dynamic Similarity
If we assume that the matching entities in both sentences are clear, as in the case of (1) and (2), then this model can be applied easily. For example, the similarity of the mental representations of sentences (1) and (2) In contrast, the dynamic similarity approach would maintain that similarity judgements are based on the similarity of mental representations and on the similarity of the cognitive processes used to construct those representations.
This dynamic similarity model might be expressed as follows:
where S a and S b are two sentences; where Ra and Rb are the respective mental representations of those items (involving any elements added by cognitive processes) and CPa and CPb are the respective cognitive processes involved in the construction of R a and Rb. In this formula s(Ra, Rb) could be computed by the static similarity model [i.e., (B)] but the essential point is that the overall perceived similarity of the two items will be based on something other than this; it will also be based on the cognitive processes used to construct the representations. The crucial prediction made by the dynamic similarity model is that in cases where the mental representations of two items are equally similar, any matches and mis-matches in the cognitive processes used to construct those representations will affect the perceived similarity of the two entities.
To test the dynamic similarity idea, we gave participants pairs of sentences in a similarity judgement task. The pairs were constructed to be same-process or different process pairs; in same-process pairs they received two sentences Keane et. al. 8 Dynamic Similarity that described two familiar states of affairs, whereas different-process pairs involved a familiar and unfamiliar sentence:
Same Process Pair
(2) The golf-ball bounced across the green and hit the flag-pole. (familiar)
Different Process Pair
The basketball bounced across the roof and hit the tree.
We assumed that the comprehension processes in sentences (1) and (2) were roughly the same because they both involve familiar states of affairs (at least to British subjects). In particular, when comprehending these sentences subjects will access specific knowledge structures in long-term memory about the state of affairs described in the sentences. In contrast, the comprehension processes underlying sentences (1) and (3) differ because (3) does not describe a familiar state of affairs (to British subjects) and hence will have to be understood by accessing different types of knowledge structures in longterm memory (e.g., more general knowledge that basketballs can bounce and that roofs are surfaces on which things can bounce). Keane (1990) has found independent evidence for the proposal that people access different knowledge in these familiar and unfamiliar sentences. He gave subjects the three objects from the sentences in a "fill-in-the-gaps" task where they had to construct spontaneously a sentence using the three objects.
He found that subjects given the object sets from familiar sentences (e.g., golf-ball, green, flag-pole) tended to produce sentences that involved similar relations to those in the original, unseen familiar sentences (like bounce and hit). In contrast, they failed to do this when given object sets from the unfamiliar sentences (e.g., basketball, roof, tree). He also found that subjects were reliably faster at producing sentences to the former set than to the latter one. These results substantiate the proposal that subjects tap into wellestablished, stereotypical knowledge about the typical states of affairs in which golfing objects occur, in a way that is not possible for the basketball set of objects.
However, having changed the objects in sentence (3) to manipulate the cognitive processes applied, we are left with the problem of whether the Keane et. al. 9 Dynamic Similarity representations underlying the same-and different-process pairs are still no different. In order to verify that the representations were no different we used the static similarity model (shown in B). This model allowed us to compute a similarity score for all the sentence pairs to be used in the judgement experiment. To compute the similarity of the objects in these sentences we had a separate set of participants generate attribute-listings for the objects in the sentences.
This model gave us similarity scores for the different sentence pairs that each subject should have produced if they were acting in accordance with the static similarity model. From this data the static similarity model predicts that similarity judgements for the same-process and different-process pairs do not differ. The mean similarity scores for same-process pairs ( So, from a static perspective, the sentence pairs should be rated as being equally similar. Twenty subjects received 12 sentence pairs (six sameprocess, six different-process) to rate on a 5-point scale (similar to not similar). They were also asked to generate attribute-listings for the objects used in the sentences to determine whether they differed from the post-tests we carried out on static similarity (no reliable differences were found). The results showed that the same-process pairs were judged to be more similar than different-process pairs. The mean similarity scores for same-process pairs (M = 3.38, SD = .76) were reliably higher than different-process pairs (M = 2.91; SD = .1.01) [t(19) = 2.44, p = 0.024, 2-tailed]. This pattern of results was also confirmed in a by-materials analysis.
Several other experiments have replicated this finding with one twist in the tale; namely, same-process pairs which involve two unfamiliar sentences are not judged to be more similar than different-process pairs. We assume this occurs because, though the cognitive processes in familiar sentences are likely to overlap, there is no reason to believe that all unfamiliar sentences will be processed in the same way. This echoes the old adage that while happy families are generally happy in the same way, unhappy families are unhappy Keane et. al. 10 Dynamic Similarity in many different ways. The conclusion we would like to draw from these experiments is that something more than "representational similarity" effects similarity judgements, that people's similarity judgements also reflect commonalities in the comprehension processes used to process the descriptions. In short, that similarity has a more dynamic aspect.
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Figure 2: Some of the Perceptual Patterns Used in the Swapping Studies
DYNAMIC SIMILARITY II: SWAPPING HISTORY IN PERCEPTUAL PATTERNS
The first instance of dynamic similarity that we have presented is really concerned with present processing influences, processes that roughly occur at the same time as the similarity judgement. Our second instance comes from considering how past processing or processing history might influence the judgement of items. In this case, we have returned to types of perceptual patterns typically used in static model research (see Figure 2 ; also Palmeri this volume). Typically, in traditional studies, perceptual patterns are presented ab initio, with little prior relevant context and often are being seen for the first time. In short, they are stimuli with no history. Yet, in everyday life such patterns would usually have a significance, a processing history; for instance, they might have been used in a particular way. To mimic this state of affairs in the laboratory, we developed a task, which allowed participants to build up a processing history for a perceptual pattern, based on swapping the positions of the elements in the pattern. Dynamic similarity would suggest that Keane et. al. 11 Dynamic Similarity patterns with the same processing histories should be more similar than ones with different processing histories, all other things being equal.
Figure 3: The Judgements Materials for the Escher Pattern Set
Swapping Histories & Similarity Judgements
In this study, there was two distinct parts to the experiment: a training task and a similarity judgement task. In the training task, participants were presented one-by-one with all the patterns that later appeared in the judgement task. So, at some stage in the training phase, people would encounter the three patterns (T, A and B) shown in Figure 3 . In the case of each pattern, they were asked to perform a set of swaps, which changed the positions of the elements of the pattern. So, given a pattern on a sheet of card, where the shapes can be moved the subject had to perform a sequence of swaps (see Figure 4 ; for an example of a typical swap sequence). One of the useful features of this task is that it is possible to use different swap sequences that will begin and end with the same configuration between the shapes but which differ in the exact swaps carried out. In the similarity judgement task, participants were shown three patterns; a target pattern (T) and two sample patterns (A and B). Their task is to say which of the sample patterns (A or B) is most like the target pattern (T) (see Figure 3) . The paradigm allows us to vary the swap histories of the A, B and T patterns systematically to create a set of patterns with the same histories (A-SwapRule1, B-SwapRule1, T-SwapRule1) and a set of patterns in which one sample pattern has an identical swap history to the target when the other sample pattern does not (A-SwapRule1, B-SwapRule2, T-SwapRule1).
Again, the dynamic similarity prediction would be that patterns with the same history would be judged to be more similar than patterns with different histories.
There is, however, one complication to this prediction. That is, it is entirely possible that some patterns are a priori more similar to the target, irrespective of processing history. Therefore, we carried out pre-tests to classify the materials into different pattern-sets that had a strong a priori bias in similarity relative to those in which there was no a priori bias. Table 1 shows the results of a pre-test in which participants were simply asked to judge the similarity of the A and B patterns to a target (without training). They show that for some pattern sets --the so-called a priori sets ---there is a tendency to view some patterns as more similar to the target (irrespective of the positioning of the sample pattern). In contrast, other pattern sets --the non-a priori sets --show no such strong preference. In advance of the experiment, we predicted that the non-a priori pattern sets should be influenced by swap history manipulations, but we were not sure how swap history might interact with the a priori pattern sets. It was not clear whether swap history would produce an effect that was strong enough to reverse a priori similarity preferences. 
_______________________________________________________________
The results of this experiment showed main effects for treatment (samehistory versus different-history) and materials (a priori versus non-a priori).
That is, the matching swap history influenced the similarity judgements made for the a priori and non-a priori materials, although the influence on the a priori materials was not as marked (see Figure 5) .
So, again, we have a confirmation of the dynamic similarity approach.
However, a static critic might say "So, What...!". It could be argued that all of these results could be accommodated within a static model. All one needs to do is to explicitly represent the swap steps as part of the representation and then compute the similarity for it and the perceptual patterns. Indeed, we used this approach ourselves when we modelled the results of these studies in a recurrent network (O'Sullivan, 1992) . However, this misses the point.
Such a proposal would be entirely ad hoc, there is nothing in the static model that would lead you to embark on these experiments. In contrast, they are a 
SIMILARITY IN THE FUTURE
Our third and final instance of dynamic similarity comes from artificial intelligence rather than cognitive psychology, although we would expect there to be a psychological counterpart to this type of similarity too. In this case, we are dealing with dynamic similarity that is prospective; that is, similarity based how one might expect to process an item in the future. This work comes form research on case-based reasoning (CBR; see also Rodriguez, this volume).
CBR systems solve various problems by using previous precedents or cases.
When presented with a problem, a CBR system searches a case-base of previous problems until it finds a similar problem. This previous problemcase is retrieved and compared to the problem and the solution to this case may then be used to solve the problem. If the problem and case are only Keane et. al. 15 Dynamic Similarity partially similar then the solution may have to be adapted to solve the problem. One of the systems we have developed used CBR to automatically develop plant-control programs (see Smyth & Keane, 1994 , 1996 , 1998 . These are programs that control the movement of buggies carrying coils of steel around steel mills. This system --called Déjà Vu --is given a specification of a control program (e.g., to move a two-speed buggy from one location to another). In its case-base it might have a similar case about moving a one-speed buggy from one place to another. The solution to this one-speed case can be used to solve the problem but it must be adapted first;
two-speed buggies operate in a different way to one-speed buggies, because they go faster they have to be slowed before they reach their destination. Déjà Vu uses its adaptation knowledge to modify aspects of the one-buggy case to make it suitable to the two-speed problem. This adaptation knowledge is stated in if-then rules of the form "If such-and-such a difference exists between a problem and a case then modify the case-solutions accordingly".
Typically, CBR systems use a form a static similarity. They simply compare the problem with the cases in the case-base using the features of both (e.g., the types of buggies used and the actions being carried out with these objects). In this sense, they are essentially the same as psychological models of similarity.
However, in Déjà Vu we considered that this form of similarity was just a proxy for the true similarity of problems and cases. CBR systems attempt to retrieve the most relevant case to a problem; that is, the case that will be the best case for solving the problem in an effective and efficient fashion.
Traditional systems retrieve the case that "appears" to be the most relevant by virtue of its similar objects and relations. However, we have shown that under some conditions these similar cases are not the most relevant; it is possible to retrieve a case that cannot be use effectively or efficiently to solve the problem (even though the case looks similar it cannot be adapted to solve the problem). As such, we argued that "the most relevant case is really the most adaptable case", the case that can be most easily modified to solve the target problem. In a series of computational tests, we have shown this to be true using a technique called "adaptation-guided retrieval"; that is, a form of retrieval that uses the objects and relations of the case as well as the adaptation knowledge associated with the case, to select the most relevant case for a problem. This work shows the exploitation of this prospective adaptation knowledge in the assessment of similarity delivers much more efficient and successful problem solving performance. Dynamic Similarity
From the dynamic similarity perspective, Déjà Vu uses a form of similarity that takes into account the processes that might be carried out on an item in the future (in this case, adaptation processes). As such, it is an instance of dynamic similarity acting in a prospective fashion thus completing our trio of instances of dynamic similarity. People appear to be very good at adapting previous cases to solve a problem; indeed, they manifest a flexibility in adaptation that has not yet been achieved in AI systems (see Keane, 1994 Keane, , 1996 . As such, it would be reasonable to expect that dynamic similarity effects, based on adaptation, are quite prevalent in human cognition, although at present no evidence on this issue is known to us.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in this chapter we have tried to show that static models of similarity are inadequate; rather we need a more process-oriented perspective on similarity, which we have termed dynamic similarity. Dynamic similarity is not really a theory of similarity, it is just a way of thinking about similarity that might eventually lead to a more precise theory. However, even as a perspective, we have tried to show that he can be very fruitful from a predictive perspective. It leads one to examine a wide range of different phenomena that would hardly figure at all in the static worldview.
